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ABSTRACT
Can history shed light on the modern debate about immigration’s labor market impact in high wage
economies? This paper examines the relationship between migration and capital flows in the age of
mass migration before 1914, the so-called first global century. It then assesses the effects of
immigration on wages and employment with and without international capital mobility in first global
century and today, that is, the second global century. The paper then explores the links between these
economic relationships and immigration policy. It concludes with an explanation for the apparent

















The impact of immigration on native-born workers has been under debate ever since the 
Irish flooded British cities early in the first industrial revolution. Over the two centuries since 
then, interest heightened as democracy began to give labor the vote. When labor got the majority 
of the votes, analysis focused increasingly on identifying the effects of immigration on wage and 
employment outcomes for non-immigrants, or what we will call here the native-born. While this 
question has thus become an important part of the research agenda on recent immigration, it has 
also occupied economic historians interested in the age of mass migration before 1914, or what 
has come to be called the first global century. Indeed, we think that the first global century -- free 
of quotas and other policy barriers – often offers clearer insights in to the impact of immigration 
than does the present global century. When making the comparison between these two global 
centuries, however, one must take care to control for the state of the world capital market. That is, 
we need to know whether international capital flows magnifies or attenuates the wage and 
employment outcomes of international migration. Once we have the answer, we are better armed 
to make an assessment of immigration’s impact conditional on whether we are looking at 
historical episodes where capital flows freely across borders or not.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, it explores the correlations between 
the international movements of labor and capital in the late nineteenth century greater Atlantic 
economy. Next, it poses some counterfactuals to quantify the effects of migration in the presence 
and absence of international capital mobility. This is followed by an overview of the effects of 
immigration on the labor market, in both global centuries. The historical evolution of policy is 
then linked to labor market outcomes of immigration in the presence and absence of international 
capital mobility. The paper concludes with some comments about the similarities and differences 
in the effects of immigration between the late nineteenth century and the present, and their 
implications for immigration policy. 
 
2. DID CAPITAL CHASE LABOR IN THE FIRST GLOBAL CENTURY? 
 
Did capital chase after labor in the past or did it move in the opposite direction? The 
answer has important implications for the effects of migration on labor markets in sending and 
receiving economies. The simplest two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model predicts that capital 
and labor should move in opposite directions: capital scarce countries should attract capital and 
labor scarce countries should attract labor. Of course, the real world is made much more   4
complicated by the presence of specific factors – like natural resources – as well as by differences 
in technology.  
  So, did labor and capital flow in the same or opposite directions in the first global century 
before World War I? Table 1 compares decade average rates of intercontinental emigration or 
immigration with the net capital flow from or to the same country. The migration flows (per 
thousand of the source or receiving country population) are measured gross and they ignore flows 
within continents, while the capital flows are constructed from balance of payments statistics. As 
the table shows, migration inflows were typically accompanied by capital inflows in the New 
World economies. The principal sources of foreign capital, the UK and Germany, also had major 
outward flows of migrants, but elsewhere in Europe the picture is more mixed. In countries like 
Sweden and Finland persistent outward flows of migrants were accompanied by persistent inward 
flows of foreign capital.  
[Table 1 and Figure 1 about here] 
  It would be more appropriate to measure population movements net of return migration 
and also to take into account the substantial migrations within Europe, but such data are much 
scarcer for the first global century. It is, however, possible to make such adjustments for a more 
limited sample from the 1890s and 1900s. The relationship between total net migration and net 
capital flows is depicted in Figure 1. The overseas countries absorbed both capital and labor, and 
five European nations sent out both (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK), but the other 
five European countries in the sample sent out labor but not capital (Scandinavia and the 
Netherlands). While the correlation is hardly perfect, it does appear that capital chased after labor 
in the first global century. In any case, the evidence certainly does not support the conventional 
HO prediction that capital and labor flow in opposite directions. Figure 1 also implies that, in the 
labor scarce overseas economies, capital flows muted any downward pressure on real wages and 
any upward pressure on unemployment rates among the native-born that would otherwise have 
been induced by the mass migration. That is, while immigrants augmented labor supplies, capital 
inflows financed accumulation and thus augmented labor demand.  
  
3. HOW MUCH DIFFERENCE DID CAPITAL MOBILITY MAKE IN THE  
FIRST GLOBAL CENTURY? 
 
What were the effects of mass migration before World War I? It is important to establish 
these magnitudes since they relate directly to the evolution of policy at that time. After all, quotas 
and other immigration restrictions were imposed in all labor scarce overseas economies after the   5
First World War. Thus, we need to know whether the dramatic policy change was driven by 
perceptions of immigration’s labor market impact.  
A question less often asked is how the incomes and wages of those left behind in the 
sending countries were affected. Did mass migrations reduce the real wage in receiving countries 
and increase the real wage in sending countries and if so by how much? And did the process of 
international migration lead to convergence across countries in wages and living standards? Such 
estimates are often based on partial equilibrium analysis, but this seems inappropriate for such 
large international flows that are likely to have had substantial economy-wide effects.  
  Over the last decade or so, a number of studies have examined the effects of mass 
migration using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. The effects of migration on real 
wages for the United States and Great Britain from one such study appear in Table 2 (Hatton and 
Williamson 1998: Chps. 9, 10). The calculations use a multi-sector competitive general 
equilibrium open economy model based on three factors (labor, capital, and land). A key 
characteristic of the CGE model is that land is specific to agriculture and immobile. Furthermore, 
the model has three sectors: agriculture and manufacturing produce tradable goods (with 
manufactures imperfectly substitutable in international markets), while services are non-tradable. 
The CGE is calibrated for a particular date, and the counterfactual explores the impact of 
increases (or reductions) in the host country labor force by the amount contributed by 
international migration for a period up to that date.  
[Table 2 about here] 
  Our calculations indicate that had there been no US immigration from 1870 to 1910 
(from any source, not just Britain), the 1910 labor force would have been about 27 percent 
smaller. Similarly, in the absence of emigration from the Britain between 1870 and 1910 (to any 
destination, not just the US), the British labor force would have been 16 percent larger than it 
actually was in 1910.
1 The counterfactual suggests that the US real wage would have been 34 
percent higher than it actually was in 1910 and the British real wage would have been about 12 
percent lower (Table 2). These results depend largely on the fact that land and capital are held at 
their actual values in 1910 and that there are strong diminishing returns to labor. As a result, the 
US rate of return on capital falls by almost 24 percent in the absence of immigration and the 
British rate rises by almost 13 percent in the absence of emigration. 
                                                 
1 Great Britain excluded Ireland. The counterfactual labor force calculations take account of the differences in 
participation rates between immigrants (or emigrants) and the respective native populations, which result from the age 
and sex selectivity of migration. They also take into account contribution to the labor force of the children of migrants. 
If the children of the migrants are ignored, the US labor force would have been about 18 percent smaller in the absence 
of immigration and the British labor force would have been about 10 percent larger in the absence of emigration.    6
  But what if we allow capital to be perfectly mobile between countries? This assumption 
seems much more plausible than the assumption of world capital immobility made in the previous 
counterfactual. After all, we have seen (Figure 1) that capital chased after labor across the 
Atlantic, presumably responding to the immigration-induced increase in US returns and the 
emigration-induced fall in British returns. Suppose, therefore, we hold the host country rate of 
return on capital constant,
2 allowing capital flows to mitigate the effects of diminishing returns on 
real wages. Table 2 shows that capital mobility reduces dramatically the effect of migration on 
real wages. In the absence of immigration, the US real wage would have been about 9 percent 
higher (in an economy with much less capital), and in the absence of emigration, the British real 
wage would have been almost 7 percent lower than it actually was. The effects with capital 
mobility are much smaller than those without capital mobility, but they are still substantial. This 
is mainly because land, which was a very important factor of production in the US economy 
before 1914, remains fixed in the counterfactual.
3 
  Similar results have been obtained for other countries. Post-famine Ireland was a poor 
and largely agricultural country, which experienced massive emigration. Even after the 
immediate effects of the famine of the 1840s, the Irish home population continued to fall—from 
6.5 million in 1851 to 4.4 million in 1911. At the same time, the share of the Irish labor force in 
agriculture declined, while real wages (both rural and urban) grew more rapidly than almost 
anywhere else in Europe. A conservative estimate has it that the Irish labor force would have 
been 49 percent higher in 1911 had it not been for the emigration that took place after 1851.
4 In 
the absence of emigration, urban real wages would have been 19 percent lower and agricultural 
wages 16 percent lower (Boyer et al. 1994: p. 235).
5 But if capital were allowed to flow into 
Ireland in response to the now larger labor force, the effects on the real wage would be much 
smaller—a 6 percent fall in both rural and urban real wages. Once again, experience from the first 
global century shows that the effects of migration on wages were greatly attenuated by capital 
mobility.  
                                                 
2 That is, we assume that the US was a price taker in world capital markets: it could get all the financial capital it 
wanted at the world interest rate. 
3 For the effects on land rents and the wage rental ratio see O’Rourke et al. (1994). For a wider analysis of wage rental 
ratios in the Atlantic economy, see O’Rourke and Williamson (1999). 
4 This counterfactual estimate of the Irish population in 1911 is described as conservative because it allows for some of 
the emigrants to be ‘replaced’ through a higher birth rate (hence less emigration would imply fewer births). If this 
effect is not allowed to operate then the counterfactual population would be 123 percent higher than the actual level in 
1911.  
5 It is also worth noting that in this counterfactual scenario GNP increases by 42 percent while GDP per capita falls by 
5 percent; land rents still rise by as much as 39 percent.    7
  In 1870 the average real wage in five New World countries was 108 percent higher than 
the average wage in 12 Old World countries, but by 1910 that gap had fallen to 85 percent.
6 That 
is, there was some wage convergence between the labor scarce New World and labor abundant 
Europe. There was also some convergence within Europe so that, overall, a 17-country index of 
real wage dispersion fell by 28 percent between 1870 and 1910. The effects of international 
migration on real wage dispersion across the 17 Atlantic economy countries can be seen in Table 
3. These counterfactuals are obtained from a three-factor production function (Taylor and 
Williamson 1997). In the absence of the mass migration between 1870 and 1910, there would 
have been divergence rather than convergence in real wages: dispersion would have increased by 
7 percent rather than decreasing by 28 percent (Table 3). Most of that fall was due to the 
changing gap between the New World and Europe which would have risen from 108 percent to 
128 percent rather than falling from 108 percent to 85 percent, a difference of 43 percentage 
points. 
[Table 3 about here] 
  Once again, these effects are sharply attenuated when capital is allowed to be mobile. In 
the absence of capital mobility, 119 percent of the real wage convergence is explained by 
migration (i.e. migration more than explains the convergence); in the presence of capital mobility, 
‘only’ 41 percent is explained by migration. Similar results are obtained for the more modest 
convergence that occurred in GDP per capita and GDP per worker. Migration explains 50 percent 
of the convergence in GDP per capita with capital immobile but only 19 percent with capital 
mobile. In short, international capital mobility in the first global century served to mute the 
impact of migration on real wages and GDP per capita by quite a bit. 
 
4. WHY ARE THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION SO DIFFICULT TO OBSERVE? 
 
Economic theory and economic history both tell us that immigration reduced real wages 
in the host country and that emigration raised real wages in the origin country during the first 
global century. But both depend on the assumptions made in the analysis. We think the same is 
true of the contemporary literature, in which debate about the effects of immigration on the wages 
and employment rates of the native-born has been intense. Most modern studies suggest that the 
effects of immigration on wages are negligible—in sharp contrast to the effects described above 
for the first global century. These modern studies have been based on the so-called spatial 
                                                 
6 The New World countries are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and the United States. The European countries 
are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and 
Sweden.    8
correlations approach, which seeks to isolate the effects of immigration by correlating wage (or 
employment rate) changes with immigrant inflows across local areas within the receiving country. 
Debate about the validity of this method is well rehearsed and thus will be treated only briefly 
here.
7  
  One important critique of the spatial correlations approach is the following: If there is a 
national labor market in which non-immigrant workers are mobile across localities, the effect of 
immigration will not be restricted to the cities or regions where immigrants locate. If, in response 
to immigrant inflows, native workers move out to other regions (or fewer move in than otherwise) 
then the wage and employment effects will be spread across the entire economy and will not be 
identified by measuring the relationship between immigration and economic outcomes observed 
across localities as in the spatial correlations approach. This debate was originally stimulated by 
the apparent absence of wage and employment effects following the Mariel boatlift that brought 
125,000 Cubans to Miami in 1980, adding about 7 percent to its labor force (Card 1990). The 
current state of play in this debate is best summarized by two papers, both on the US, that take 
opposing views. In his analysis of census data, David Card (2001) finds little evidence that 
immigration into major cities caused the native-born to move out. Furthermore, he finds that 
while immigration caused changes in the skill mix, these had little effect on relative wages. In 
contrast, George Borjas (2003) estimates the outcomes of immigration for the native born by 
skill/experience groups at the national level (hence avoiding spatial mobility effects). He finds 
that immigration reduces the earnings for the same native-born skill/experience group, and hence 
that the labor demand curve does indeed slope downwards to the right.  
What support is there for the spatial displacement hypothesis? Table 4 provides some 
evidence on this issue, here for regions in the United Kingdom between 1982 and 2000. The 
result indicates that a net immigration of 100 foreign citizens into a region in the south of 
England reduced net immigration from other British regions by 43. Two lessons may be drawn 
from Table 4. First, it is essential to control for the demand side variables that determine internal 
migration when making the immigration impact assessment. Second, and even more important, 
Table 4 reports results for only the six (booming) southern regions since these were the ones 
where immigrants left a significant mark on labor markets. When all British regions are included, 
the measured displacement effect is much weaker. This result is hardly surprising since 
immigration was very small in the north compared with other shocks to labor supply and demand. 
The greater the size of the immigration shock the clearer is its effect on the labor market.  
[Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
                                                 
7  For summaries of the relevant literature, see Borjas (1994, 1999) and Hatton and Williamson (2005a: Chp. 14).   9
  Did the first global century see the same internal mobility response that we see in the 
second global century? Evidence from the United States suggests that it did. Table 5 gives an 
estimate of the effects, by decade, of immigration on the eastern and midwestern states. The 
estimate is strikingly similar to the contemporary estimate for the UK in Table 4. It suggests that 
for every 100 immigrants arriving in an eastern (gateway) state, 40 native-born were displaced to 
other states. An important feature of the first global century in the US was its great westward 
settlement, an internal migration which accelerated as the late nineteenth century progressed. 
Most historians see this migration as a land-induced pull from the west, while we see it as both 
pull from the west and an immigration-induced push from the east. In any case, whether looking 
at the past or the present, it is important to focus on regions and localities where there are large 
immigration shocks; otherwise the displacement effects will be lost in a thick fog of other 
influences.   
  If the displacement effect had been one-for-one, we would observe no relative labor 
market effects of immigration in gateway cities and states at all—even though there may have 
been substantial effects at the national level. But Table 4 and 5 suggest a displacement coefficient 
of around 0.4, an effect that is far from fully offsetting one-for-one. Thus, we should still observe 
some imprint of immigration on local wage or employment outcomes. Hence, other mechanisms 
are needed to explain the modest (or zero) effects found in so many studies. Those mechanisms 
could come from internal trade in goods or from internal capital mobility. Unfortunately, there is 
little data available that measures regional capital mobility within countries. However, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that if capital is fairly mobile between countries, then it would be at least as 
mobile within countries. Since capital mobility attenuates immigration’s wage effects at the 
national level, it should have an even greater attenuating effect at the local level. 
 
5. THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF BIG IMMIGRATION SHOCKS IN THE  
SECOND GLOBAL CENTURY 
 
The preceding discussion suggests that we should be looking for big migration shocks in 
order to discern clearly the effects of immigration (or possibly emigration) on real wages, 
employment and other labor market variables of interest. Furthermore, they must be exogenous 
shocks or ‘natural experiments’ in order to avoid confounding migration cause and effect. 
Unfortunately, the first global century offers few useful cases: although the trans-Atlantic   10
migrations were very large, they were also driven largely by economic incentives. Thus, they can 
hardly be viewed as exogenous.
8  
  A number of more recent natural experiments have been examined, and these have 
sometimes been interpreted as supporting the modest-immigration-effects-on-wages school of 
thought. Closer inspection, however, suggests that these widely cited cases illustrate quite large 
wage effects, especially if we focus on the economy-wide estimates rather than those which use 
the spatial correlations approach. The first natural experiment is offered by the inflow into 
metropolitan France from Algeria following the latter’s independence. These immigrants were 
largely French-born expatriates fleeing the regime change and about 900,000 of them flooded 
France during 1962, adding 1.9 percent to the population and 1.6 percent to the labor force. 
Jennifer Hunt (1992) found that the overall effect was to reduce the real wage by 1.3 percent and 
to increase the unemployment rate by 0.3 percentage points. Thus, the Algerian immigration 
shock was sufficiently large to have a clear effect on the French labor market. Indeed, it implies a 
labor demand elasticity of -1.3/+1.6 = -0.8, quite consistent with other aggregate labor demand 
elasticity estimates (Hammermesh 1993). 
  Larger still was the influx of Portuguese retornados when independence struggles in 
Angola and Mozambique came to a climax in 1974-6. This caused a spike in net immigration to 
Portugal that peaked at 40 per thousand in 1975.
9 The 600,000 Portuguese retornados added 7 
percent to the Portuguese population over these few years. William Carrington and Pedro di Lima 
(1996: p. 344) found that the influx of retornados reduced the Portuguese real wage by 5-9 
percent for every 10 percent addition to the labor force (implying a labor demand elasticity lying 
between -0.5 and -0.9). The aggregate effect can be seen in Figure 2 where Portuguese real wages 
and employment are plotted as ratios to her two closest neighbors, Spain and France. This 
comparison is complicated by the recession of the mid-1970s, which was particularly severe in 
Spain, and so the comparison with France may be more informative. The retornados were 
absorbed slowly into employment; even as late as 1981, their unemployment rate was 14 percent 
compared with 6 percent for other workers. But the gap diminished and, as Figure 2 shows, 
relative employment rose and the relative real wage fell as the immigrants were gradually 
absorbed.  
[Figures 2, 3 and 4 about here] 
                                                 
8  The great Irish famine might seem like a good natural experiment. However, it was not exogenous to the Irish 
economy and hence the effects of emigration on Ireland would be hard to distinguish from other effects of the famine. 
While it might be possible to look at the effect of famine migration on the US economy, data constraints would make 
this a difficult task.  
9 It is also worth noting the persistent net out-migration from Portugal during the guestworker era and the reversal of 
that trend after the arbeitstopp in 1973/4.     11
  An even clearer natural experiment is offered by the movement of Russian Jews to Israel 
when the Soviet Union lifted its restriction on emigration late in 1989. Israel’s immigration rate 
averaged 3.7 per thousand of the population in the decade before 1990. It surged to 35 per 
thousand in 1990-1 and then continued at 10-15 per thousand for the rest of the decade. This 
immigration shock added 610,000, equivalent to 7 percent of the population, in the first two 
years, and by the mid-1990s the influx amounted to a million or about 12 percent of the 
population. The effects on the labor market were equally dramatic: the working age population 
increased by 8 percent up to 1992 and by 16 percent up to 1997. The aggregate data suggests that 
this influx left a clear mark on the labor market.
10 Figure 3 plots percentage deviations from 
logarithmic trends, calculated for the pre-shock period 1980-1989. The labor force was more than 
15 percent above trend by the mid-1990s. Employment rose more slowly at first, as the 
immigrants were absorbed gradually into employment, but by the mid 1990s it was more than 20 
percent above trend.
11 Relative to its trend, the real wage plunged in the early 1990s and then 
hovered at about 10 percent below trend for the rest of the decade. This implies a labor demand 
elasticity of -0.67, quite consistent with the estimates for France and Portugal cited above, 
ranging between -0.5 and -0.9. It is also consistent with the recent Borjas finding that US 
immigrants do indeed crowd out native-born and that “the labor demand curve is downward 
sloping” (Borjas 2003).). 
  These cases provide clear and decisive evidence that immigration lowers real wages. But 
what about international capital flows? Did they serve to mitigate the effects on wages in these 
modern cases, much like we observe for the first global century? The sudden increase in the 
Israeli labor supply reduced the capital-labor ratio and increased the return on capital. As a result, 
gross investment in machinery and equipment increased from 12 percent of the stock in the 1980s 
to 19 percent in 1994-6 (Cohen and Hsieh 2000: p. 19). This accumulation response was financed 
largely from abroad. As Figure 4 shows, the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP 
increased by about 8 percentage points between 1990 and 1996. We conclude that labor market 
adjustments would have been much more painful and the wage effects would have been much 
larger in the absence of elastic international capital market responses. In contrast, adjustments 
                                                 
10 For studies of the economic outcomes of this immigration shock see Friedberg (2001), Cohen and Hsieh (2000), and 
Eckstein and Cohen (2003). 
11 In 1991 the unemployment rate was 37.3 percent among immigrants, compared with 9 percent among non-
immigrants. The difference evaporated over the 1990s and by 2000 it was just two percentage points, 10.4 percent for 
immigrants and 8.4 percent for non-immigrants.    12




6. WHY DID THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR MARKET STAY SO OPEN FOR SO LONG? 
 
We have argued that large-scale immigration has tended to reduce economy-wide real 
wages, both in the recent and more distant past. In democratic economies where most of the votes 
are held by labor, it might be expected that immigration should generate strong anti-immigrant 
public opinion. This expectation suggests a paradox. Why did the late nineteenth century labor 
scarce economies stay so open to immigration for so long?  
  The end of the era of free immigration is traditionally seen as the closing of the door by 
the United States, with the imposition of a literacy test in 1917 followed by the first quota Act in 
1921, and further tightening of the quota in 1924 and 1928. As Claudia Goldin (1994) puts it: 
“The American policy of virtually unrestricted immigration was transformed, almost 
overnight, into a quota system that would last, virtually unchanged, until 1965. The 
ultimate switch in policy is not hard to explain. The perplexing part of the legislative 
history of immigration restriction is its timing. More astonishing than the closing of the 
door in 1921 is that it remained open despite twenty-five years of assault during which 17 
million immigrants from among the poorest nations in Europe found refuge in America 
(1994: p. 223).”   
Other New World countries also tightened their immigration controls, with the decisive shifts 
coming a decade later.  
  Why didn’t immigration controls come sooner? Part of the answer is suggested by Figure 
5, where we plot an average index of the immigration policy stance among five New World 
countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, US). The index for each country varies from +5 
(strong anti-immigration policy) to -5 (strong pro-immigration policy). These indices are based 
on a variety of changing conditions like restricting the immigration of certain types of 
individuals, restricting immigrant rights upon arrival, imposing head taxes, applying literacy tests 
and immigration quotas, removing subsidies for passage, and no longer offering land grants to 
immigrants. The index illustrates that restrictive immigration measures were on the rise before 
1917; hence, there is plenty of evidence confirming policy backlash even before the quotas. 
                                                 
12 Although the immigrants were more highly skilled than the natives, no shift in the output composition towards skill 
intensive sectors took place (Cohen and Hsieh 2000: p. 15). One reason for this apparently counter-intuitive result is 
that the Russian immigrants were unable to use their skills effectively because many of them lacked fluency in Hebrew.     13
Nevertheless, these measures did little to stem the immigrant tide until the tougher  exclusionary 
policies were enacted, beginning in the second decade of the twentieth century. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
  Ashley Timmer and Jeffrey Williamson (1998) have examined the determinants of these 
measures of policy. They find that immigration policy became more restrictive as the number of 
immigrants increased, as the wage of unskilled workers fell relative to average income, and as the 
share of immigrants from poor and ethnically different  countries increased. They interpret the 
results as reflecting the downward pressure on real wages, particularly at the lower end of the 
skill distribution. In addition they find a high degree of persistence in policy, suggesting that it 
responded to these forces only with fairly long lags. Finally, they suggest that there was some 
direct policy spillover from one country to another especially from the United States, the big 
policy leader, to the small policy followers.  
  Given the accumulation of anti-immigration forces in the late nineteenth century, why 
were the most restrictive policies delayed so long? A series of bills were presented to US 
Congress aiming to restrict immigration by requiring that immigrants pass a literacy test. As early 
as 1897, the House vote favored restriction in the form of the Literacy Act but the anti-
immigration Congress was not able to override the presidential veto until 1917. Looking across 
US cities, Goldin (1994) found that wage growth was slower the greater was the growth in the 
proportion of immigrants.
13 She also found that the greater the wage effect, the more likely that 
the local representative in Congress would vote to restrict immigration (Goldin 1994: p. 254). Her 
results seem to be consistent with correlates of policy noted by Timmer and Williamson.     
  Given that anti-immigrant sentiment was so strong in US Congress, it would not have 
taken very much to tip the balance in favor of restriction. A collapse in world capital markets 
during the First World War and the interwar years offered one such ‘tipping’ trigger: since capital 
mobility helped mute the impact of immigration on real wages and unemployment, the reduction 
of capital mobility should have heightened the impact. This ‘tipping’ trigger is usually neglected 
in immigration policy accounts of this period. To repeat, most small New World economies were 
not able to import the same amounts of capital in the 1920s, and international capital flows dried 
up completely in the 1930s. It therefore became much harder to absorb immigrants without 
substantially reducing the wages of natives. The Great War offered another ‘tipping’ trigger, 
since it heightened some anti-European feelings. The Great Depression offered yet a third 
‘tipping’ trigger, this time for the smaller policy-lagging New World countries. The literacy test 
                                                 
13 This may seem inconsistent with the argument presented earlier that internal migration served to dissipate the effects 
of foreign immigration on wages across the entire economy. But since the displacement effect is less than one there 
may still be some local effect.    14
first introduced in Natal in 1897 was adopted by the newly Federated Australia in 1901 and by 
Canada in 1910. But quotas and other restrictions were to wait until the thirties when they were 
introduced by Australia and South Africa (1930), followed by New Zealand (1931), Canada 
(1932) and Brazil (1934). This severe tightening of immigration policies is often seen as a direct 
response to the Great Depression, but we think the latter acted instead as a trigger that unleashed 
the effects of much more fundamental and longer-term forces. 
   
7. DOES HISTORY OFFER LESSONS FOR TODAY’S IMMIGRATIONS? 
 
We have argued that there are strong parallels between the effects of mass migration in 
the past and present, but one must guard against unqualified history lessons. Three major 
differences between the first and the second global centuries suggest caution with lessons of 
history. 
  Late nineteenth century immigration had significant wage effects even in the presence of 
capital mobility. The main reason seems to be that land (and, more generally, natural resources) 
was a much more important input to aggregate production than it is today. The more open are 
capital markets, and the less important are immobile factors such as land, the smaller should be 
the wage effects of immigration. Consequently, the host country policy backlash that arises from 
wage effects should be smaller today than it was a century ago. On the other hand, in the less 
developed world where land and agriculture loom much larger, emigration is still likely to 
increase the real wage of those left behind, just as it did in Ireland and elsewhere in poor Europe 
in the late nineteenth century.
14  
  While land has become less important, skills have become more important. And if 
unskilled migrants (unskilled relative to host country natives) dominate the flow from poorer to 
richer countries, then skills might be viewed as an immobile factor just as land was in the 
nineteenth century. But there is one big difference. Skilled workers have votes and they now 
constitute the majority in most developed countries whereas landowners were in the minority in 
the late nineteenth century. If skilled and unskilled labor are treated as different factors of 
production then the evidence suggests that the effect of unskilled immigration on the skilled wage 
rate is ambiguous and most empirical studies find it to be small. Studies that find negative wage 
effects mainly find them in the unskilled segment of the labor market. Since the median voter in 
today’s high wage host country is skilled, rather than unskilled – as was true in the first global 
                                                 
14 For evidence of the effect of migration on real wages in modern Africa, see Hatton and Williamson (2003).    15
century, the negative labor market effects may have less impact on public opinion today, and 
therefore on policy, than they did a century ago.   
  The third change is perhaps the most important for policy, and this concerns the fiscal 
impact of immigration. A century ago, state welfare programs were miniscule, but they grew 
rapidly in the 1930s, and by the 1970s welfare spending loomed large in all western economies 
(Lindert 2004). It is also clear that less skilled immigrants are more likely to be a burden on the 
welfare state. Thus the average native-born worker in a relatively rich country may be negatively 
disposed to immigration, not because of labor market competition (as was the case in the late 
nineteenth century when the median voter was an unskilled worker), but because of the likely 
effects on the welfare budget and therefore on his or her tax liability.
15 
  Such arguments are supported by the evidence on public opinion offered by the ISSP’s 
1995 module on National Identity. These data have been widely analysed and the results will be 
treated only briefly here.
16 Table 6 reports the average score for anti-immigration attitudes in the 
more developed counties in the survey. These scores range from 1 ‘immigration [to the 
respondent’s country] should be increased a lot’, to 5 ‘immigration should be reduced a lot’. This 
measure suggests that attitudes in most countries are mildly anti-immigration.   
[Tables 6 and 7 about here] 
  Table 7 presents regression results that have much in common with earlier studies, with 
the difference that these include country-level variables as well as individual-level variables. 
Measures of ‘patriotism’ and ‘chauvinism’ derived from other attitudinal questions have the 
expected positive effects, supporting the view that prejudice matters.
17 Other notable results are 
that second generation immigrants and those with high education (more than a secondary 
education) are significantly less hostile to immigration than those without these characteristics. 
The latter result seems consistent with the notion that the more skilled have less to fear from 
immigration. Thus, just as the owners of land were more pro-immigration a century ago 
(compared to other citizens), the owners of skills are more pro-immigration today (compared with 
other citizens). As we stressed earlier, the big difference between the two global centuries is that 
the owners of skills command more votes today than the owners of land did a century ago.   
  While the list of countries with the relevant data is short, what we do have supports the 
view that the richer and the more unequal the country, the more hostile are attitudes to 
immigration. More to the point, attitudes are more anti-immigration the more immigrants there 
                                                 
15 It is also important to recognize the limited franchise in many countries before 1914 (Hatton and Williamson 2005b). 
16 For more detailed discussion of these data and econometric results using them, see Mayda (2004), and O’Rourke and 
Sinnott (2004).  
17 We follow O’Rourke and Sinnott (2004) in defining these variables. Dustmann and Preston (2000) provide other 
evidence of prejudice towards certain racial groups using British data.     16
are and the larger is the welfare state. The richer and more unequal is the host country, the more 
likely are poor immigrants to depend on welfare. The larger is immigration and the bigger is the 
welfare state, the more costly this is likely to be for the average host country voter.  
  In a world of capital mobility, the wage effects of immigration are attenuated. Since those 
capital market conditions prevailed both before 1914 and after 1970, they cannot therefore offer 
an explanation for the more restrictive policies today. In a world where skills matter, voters have 
less reason to fear the labor market impact from (relatively unskilled) immigration. Here again, 
this fact cannot therefore offer an explanation for the more restrictive policies today. What does 
offer an explanation for today’s more restrictive immigration policies is the threat to the public 
purse. Even if these fiscal costs are smaller than the public thinks, the perception still shapes 
public attitudes towards immigration.
18    
 
                                                 
18 We have made no mention of racism, patriotism and xenophobia since there is no reason to think that the intensity of 
these attitudes changed between the two global centuries.    17
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Table 1 
Intercontinental Gross Migration and Net Capital Flows, 1860s to 1900s 
M=immigrants per 1000 per annum; K=net capital outflow as percent of GDP per annum 
 
    1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 
Austria-Hungary M    0.29 1.06 1.61  4.76
  K        
Belgium M      0.86 0.35  0.61
  K        
British Isles  M  5.18 5.04 7.02 4.38  6.53
 K  3.47 3.79 5.55 2.95  4.56
Denmark M    2.06 3.94 2.23  2.82
 K  0 -0.37 -2.12 -2.56  -2.94
France M  0.12 0.15 0.31 0.13  0.14
 K  3.45 2.85 -1.80 -0.37  3.33
Germany M    1.47 2.87 1.01  0.45
 K  0 1.43 2.30 1.60  1.32
Netherlands M  0.59 0.46 1.23 0.5  0.51
 K  6.80 -5.28 2.14 1.80  2.46
Norway M  5.76 4.73 9.52 4.49  8.33
 K  0 0.08 1.07 -4.46  -4.64
Sweden M  5.76 4.73 9.52 4.12  4.2
 K  -1.60 -2.06 -4.48 -1.36  -2.89
Switzerland M    1.3 3.2 1.41  1.39
  K        
Finland M      1.32 2.32  5.45
 K  -5.48 -6.42 -6.35 -5.65  -5.60
Italy M    1.05 3.36 5.02  5.69
 K  -2.91 0.12 -1.36 1.65  2.13
Portugal M  1.9 2.89 3.8 5.08  5.69
  K        
Spain M      3.62 4.38  5.66
 K  -1.88 -1.03 -0.68 0.72  0.28
Canada M  -8.32 -5.48 -7.84 -4.88  -16.76
 K  0 -7.31 -7.22 -5.06  -7.58
United States  M  -6.49 -5.46 -8.58 -5.3  -10.2
 K  0 -0.54 -1.15 0.33  0.28
Argentina M  -9.91 -11.7 -22.17 -16.39  -29.18
 K  0 0 0 -3.72  -4.24
Brazil M    -2.04 -4.11 -7.23  -3.38
  K        
Australia  M      -9.08  -16.31
 K  -16.97 -7.20 -12.17 -7.74  -3.36
 
Sources: Migration data from Ferenczi and Willcox (1929: pp. 200-1, 209). Data for the balance of 
payments residual kindly supplied by Alan Taylor (Taylor 2002). Blanks indicate absence of data, but 
qualitative evidence suggests trivial flows.    21
 
Table 2 
Counterfactual General Equilibrium Effects of Migration on Real Wages 
 
  Effect on 1890 economy of no 
migration from 1870 to 1890 
Effect on 1910 economy of no 
migration from 1870 to 1910 
 Capital 
Immobile 
Capital Mobile  Capital 
Immobile 
Capital Mobile 
United  States  +14.4 +3.7  +34.0 +9.2 
Great Britain  –8.8  –4.7  –12.2  –6.6 
 
Source: Hatton and Williamson (1998: p. 212). Counterfactuals use a three-sector open economy 
computable general equilibrium model for each country. The counterfactual with capital immobile holds 







Migration and Economic Convergence in the Atlantic Economy, 1870-1910 
 
 Dispersion  (1870  =100)  Convergence explained, 1870-
1910 (percent of total) 





Real Wages  72  107  119  41 
GDP per capita  82  91  50  19 
GDP per worker  71  91  72  23 
 
Source: Taylor and Williamson (1997: pp. 40, 42). The counterfactuals are derived from a three factor 
production function (labor, capital and land) calibrated for seventeen countries of the Greater Atlantic 
economy. The measure of dispersion used is the variance divided by the mean squared. The baseline 
counterfactuals reproduced here assume that: that the elasticity of factor substitution is 1; that the relative 
participation migrants to non-migrants is 1.65 and that the effective worker ratio (or relative efficiency) of 
immigrants to non-immigrants is 0.8.  
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Table 4 
Immigration and Internal Migration: UK Regions by Year, 1982-2000 
 
 
NetMigRt = − 0.43 NetImRt-1 + 0.44 LogVacst – 0.13 LogUnRt + 2.78 LogEarnt-1 
                      (2.1)                      (2.3)                    (0.3)                    (2.4) 
 
                   – 0.83 LogHsePt + 0.94 ΔLogHsePt;   Adj R
2 = 0.92 
                     (2.2)                     (1.7) 
 
 
Note: ‘t’ statistics in parentheses. 
Sample: Balanced panel of region/years. The regions are: Greater London, Rest of the Southeast, East 
Anglia, East Midlands, West Midlands and South West.  
Variable definitions: NetMigR = net migration rate into the region from elsewhere in the UK, per 1000 of 
the region’s population; NetImR = net immigration from abroad of foreign citizens per 1000 of the region’s 
population; LogVacs = log of the region’s vacancy inflow rate; LogUnR = Log of the region’s 
unemployment rate; LogEarn = Log average earnings of full time equivalent workers in the region; 
LogHseP = log of average house price in the region; ΔLogHseP = change in log house price. 
Method: OLS regression; fixed region effects and year dummies included but not reported. Note that, 
because year dummies are included, this is equivalent to defining the logs of vacancies, unemployment, 
lagged earnings and house prices as log ratios to the UK mean.  
Source: Hatton and Tani (2005: Table 5).  
 
Table 5 
Immigration and Internal Migration: US States by Decade, 1870-1910 
 
 
NetMigRt = − 0.40 NetImRt + 0.44 EmpGrtht + 0.16 ShrMft + 0.07 ShrUrbt  
                      (2.6)                      (5.2)                    (0.3)                    (1.3) 
 
                   – 0.01 Shr15-24t + 0.01 LogEarnt;   R
2 = 0.84 
                     (1.5)                     (0.3) 
 
 
Note: ‘t’ statistics in parentheses. 
Sample: Balanced panel of changes across 14 states by 3 decades. The states are those located in New 
England, the Mid-Atlantic and East North Central.  
Variable definitions: NetMigR = net migration rate into the state from elsewhere in the US between 
censuses, per 1000 of the region’s population; NetImR = net immigration from foreign born between 
censuses per 1000 of the region’s population; EmpGrth = rate of growth of manufacturing employment 
across the decade; ShrMf = share of labor force in manufacturing at beginning of decade; ShrUrb = 
proportion of population urban at beginning of decade; Shr1524 = share of population aged 15-24 at 
beginning of decade; LogEarn = real earnings in manufacturing at beginning of decade . 
Method: Instrumental variables regression, instrumenting NetImR and EmpGrth; decade dummies included 
but not reported.  
Source: Hatton and Williamson (1998: p. 168).  
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Table 6 












Australia 3.768  2318  Japan 3.373  1000 
Austria 3.808  923  Netherlands  3.822  1864 
Canada 3.311  1310  New  Zealand  3.737  950 
Germany   4.270  1630  Norway  3.845  1333 
Great Britain  4.060  955  Spain  3.385  1014 
Ireland 3.073  919  Sweden  3.970  1132 
Italy 4.148  1020  USA 3.880  1090 
     All  countries  3.770  17458 
 
Source: Based on data from the 1995 International Social Survey (ISSP) module on national identity. These 
figures are the average attitude towards immigration and imports on a five point scale where respondents 
were asked whether the number of immigrants/imports into their country should increased a lot (1), 





The Determinants of Anti-Immigration Attitudes 
 
   Explanatory 
   Variable 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
   Explanatory 
   Variable 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Individual-level variables  Country-level variables 
‘Patriotism’  0.055  (1.81)  Log GDP Per Capita  0.692  (2.58) 
‘Chauvinism’  0.374  (8.23)     Inequality  1.850  (2.26) 




-0.283  (6.21)  Welfare Expenditure 
/GDP 
0.047  (7.26) 
Female  0.035  (1.13)  Share of Pop. Foreign  0.044  (3.13) 
Age/100  0.009  (0.07)     
Married  0.038  (1.77)     
Highly Educated  -0.219  (7.13)  R
2  0.207 
Employed  -0.008  (0.51)  No of obs  14820 
 
Notes: The countries included are those listed in Table 6 above. The number of observations is reduced due 
to missing data for some of the individual level explanatory variables. t-statistics in parentheses are from 
robust standard errors clustered by country.  
Sources: ISSP survey as Table 6 above. Hatton and Williamson (2005b).  
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Sources: See notes to Table 1. 
 
Source: Hatton and Williamson (2005a), p. 304 
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Labor Supply and the Real Wage in Israel, 1980-2000




















































Source: Hatton and Williamson (2005b). 
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